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Islamic Political Thought and Cultural Revival
in Modern Indonesia
Abstraksi: Dilihat dari pemikiran politik Islam, sedikitnya ada tiga arus
pemikiran di kakngan intelektual Islam Indonesia: arusformalistik, mus
-subsantiaistik, 
dan arus fundamenalistik.
Arus formalistik menekankan pengunaan bentuk-bentuk Islam yang
diikuti iecara keat. Ia menekankan simbol'simbol buda4ta Arab yang
dipercaya sebagai Islam yang murni. Menekankan penSSundan terma'
ti*o budayaArab di nigari non'Arab sEerti Indonesia, menunjukkan
pm tin gny a' bagi mere ka formalism e keag4?r7dfun. Makn a-m akna s ub stantif
'yang 
6isa diungkapkan dengan bahasa lqin diparydaltg. kurang penting
'dibinding kzliu diungkapkan dalam bahasa Arab. Tekanannya di sini
Erleak p-ada pengaruh nyata dari kaa-kau dari pada makna episte-
m o I o gis dari pem ah am an.
Biberapalnsur dari kecenderungan formalistik ini ada pada. kelom-
pok inteliktual universalis, Menurut kelompok ini Islam dddldh $am1
'uniaersal dan menyeluruh (toal). Ia menekankan kekuasaan Tuban di
bumi, dan, sEerti pd.ndangan fundamenalisme Islam, bahaya '\flestox-
ication' aai "m)ryarakat jahili modern". Bagi helompok universalis,
Islam harus dilembagakzn agdr menjadi kekuaun bagi pernbebasan di
dunia ini. pelemba{azn ini akan membuka ialan bagi terbentuknya
masyarakat moderi eur'anis. Pelembagaan Iskm ini merupakan ciri
utalnd dari kecenderungan formalisme Islam.
Dakm uitayah politik,- arus formalisme Islam memandang mende'
saknya suatu blntuk institusi potitiA klam (negara atau pdrai politik
tski). Arus formalisme Islam-bertentangdn dengan arus. Is.lam subsan -
tiUsiih Yaig terakhir ini menekankan subsansi dari pad.a bentuk, niki'
nilai klami-dari pada lembaga-lembagaformal yang berl,abe! Islam. Per-
harian utamd. keiompok inirddlah bagaimana nilai-nilai Islami hi_dup
dan berpengaruh dalam lembaga-lembaga politik ranpa harus memberi'
kan kbil tskm terhadap lembaga-lembagatersebut, Langkah yangditem-
puh kemudian lebih pada kultur dalam rangka membangun Indonesia
moderen.
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Gagasan pendekatan kultural dari pada pendekatan politik dalam
Islamisasi Indonesia membuka rudng bagi mungkinnya pribumisasi Is-
larn,yakni mewujudkan nilai-niki unioersal Islam ke dakm kultur bang-
sa Indonesia yang beragam. Dalam konteks ini pula kultur Islam harus
dipandangbanya sebagai salah satu dari sekian banyak kultur bangsa. Ia
hanya bersifat komplementer terhadap kuhur Indonesia secara keseluruh-
an. Dengan pemikiran ini diharapkan masyarakat Muslim punya kesa-
daran kebangsazn, dan negara Indonesia harus dibangun atds dasar ke-
sadaran ini.
Gagasan subsantivistik berirnplikzsi pada perlunya deideo lo gisasi Is-
lam. Dengan kerangka ini, posisi Islam menja"di jelas dan absah dalam
menerima Pancasila sebagai ideologi negard Indonesia.
Islam subsantiaistik ini juga menjelrna dalam komitrnen lain aas
bangsa dan masyarakat Indonesia. Ia tidak hanya bergerak pada level
intelektual dan tersosialisasi secara kultural, melainkan pada gerakan-
gerakan sosial dan ekonomi pada tinghat maryarakat. Ini mengambil
bentuk dakm geraknn-gerakan NGO. Gerakan ini pada dasarnya tidak
politis, namun dapar berdampak politik. Karena ia punya perhatian be-
sar terhadap pemberdayaan maryarakzt lapisan bauah yang pada giliran-
nya diharapkan dapat membangun masyarakat sipil yang k uat.
Di sampingdua arus di aas, arus Islam fundamenalis dan reuiaalis
dalam pemikiran politik Islam juga perlu mendapat perhatian. Arus ke-
tiga ini memandang bahan dua arus di aas rclah gagal membuktikan
klam sebagai kekuaun anding (countey' atas modernisasi Indonesia.
Ia menekankan agar dasar-dasar Islam masuk ke dakm realitas sosial-
politik Indonesia, dan berupaya untuk mengbidupkan kembali kubur
Islam. Arus ini juga berusaha untuk bereksperimen dengan dpa yang
mereka dnggap xbagai lembagalembaga Islam, Merekz berupaya men-
jadikzn gerakan mereka sebagai oposisi aus Iskm yang mdpdn.
Gerakan-gerakan fundamenalis ini terus meningkzt, namun diper-
kirakan tidak akan berkembang menjadi kekuaun yang signifikan se-
cara politis di Indonesia. Ia muncul dari situasi politik tertentu ketika
masyarakat Muslim terancam, dan tidak ada organisasi Islam yang ber-
suara. Maka ketikz organisasi-organisasi klam menjadi lebih artikulatif,
gerakanfundamenalis akzn menjadi tidak signifikan lagi.
Di samping itu, gerakan fundammalis klarn juga tidak menarik bagi
bagian terbesar masltarakat Indonesia. Karena Tsdtak masyarakat Islam
Indonesia pada dasarnya tolnan dan moderat, dan karena itu tidak
mudah menerima ahcrnatif-ahernatif radikal bagi prubahan seperti yang
sering diprj uangkan kelompok fundammulis I skm. Kecenderun gan po li-
tik Indonuia sekarangyang lebih kondusif bagi Islam juga dapit meng-
bambat berkembangnya gerakan ini.
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his paper tries to describe the dynamic of Islamic political
thought in modern Indonesia (particularly during the New Or-
der period). It argues that during this period a significant num-
ber of Muslim intellectuals have developed ideas which serve as an
intellectual response to the modernization of Indonesia. Islamic po-
litical thought has played an important role in this context. It be-
came one of the determinant variables for the transformational prac-
tices of Islamic polity which, in turn, encouraged a harmonious rela-
tionship between Islam and the state. This, together with internal
dynamics of the Muslim community, has paved the way for a cul-
tural revival of Islarn.
The paper does not pretend to render a value judgment either
about the level of sincerity in the relationship, nor about the degree
of that cultural revival. The ensuing discussion is an attempt to illus-
trate the variety of ideas among Muslim intellectuals regarding the
appropriate political relationship between Islam and the state, upon
which remarks about the cultural revival of Islam are rendered. In so
doing, this paper touches upon some dimensions of modern Islamic
political thought in Indonesia, which includes its historical roots and
socio-political setting, mainstreams, and contributive role towards
an Islamic cultural revival.
The emergence of political ideas among Muslim intellectuals in
the face of the regime's modernization project and political agenda is
perceived as part of the defense mechanism by supporters of politi-
cal Islam, who seem to be passing the phase of self-resignation and
projection toward a cultural retrospection.l
Islamic Political Thought: An overview
Islamic political thought reflects a long-standing and continuing
intellectual inquiry into the nature and role of government as an
indispensable instrument to secure both religious and temporal af-
fairs, and to implement Islamic ideals within society. This is the re-
sult of serious efforts in exploring Islamic injunctions (iitihAd) and
domesticating them into a particular real politikin any given time. In
this context, political thought includes both power politics to Pro-
vide theories about the system of government and allocative politics
as a way of implementing Islamic values into the political process.z
As with other aspects of Islamic thought, Islamic political thought
deals with two conceptual problems: the problbm of the relation-
ship between revelation and reason, and that of the relationship be-
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tween religion and culture. Islamic polirical theorizing is thus an
effort to reconcile the demands of the sbari'ah and oolitical realities.
The reconciliation process has, in the course ofiime, produced a
variety of tendencies and mainsrreams, that primarily stemmed from
the absence of any clear cut explanations of the issue in the very
sources of Islam, the Qur'in and the Sunnah, and how the two were
interpreted by various Muslim political thinkers. Diverse socio-po-
litical and cultural conditions also influenced the narure of ideas and
their expression.
Since Muslim political thinkers have as their point of departure
the same religious belief (i.e., Islam) and have a common concern,
namely about how to realize klamic injunctions into political reali-
ties, these thinkers posited the shart'ah as the ethical and moral basis
for political expediencies. Yet their perception of the shart'ah and
how it should be implemented in the political sphere reveal a diver-
sity of ideas, as shown by the exisrence of various tendencies and
paradigms.
These paradigms, although they maintain a symbiosis between
religion and politics in Islam, each has a different emphasis. The pre-
modern (Sunni) paradigm emphasized rhe supremacy of religion over
politics and offered legitimating theories 
-based either on Islamiclegal ideas, and pre-hlamic practices and moral teachings, or on specu-
lative and idealized conceprs of the existing political milieu. These
theories of legitimacy served to confirm the existing political insti-
tution, i.e., the historic caliphate, without critical inquiry into the
validity of its nature from the perspective of the shari'ah. Rather,
these theories focused on the political processes, so as to examine
whether or not they conformed to shart'ah principles. The symbiosis
of religion and politics, in this respecr, did not exisr at a conceptual
level, but at a more practical one, because the pre-modern thinkers
were not faced with a "secularistic ideology", but rather, with a "secu-
laristic mode of life" appearing in the form of materialistic and hedo-
nistic tendencies among the political elite.
The pre-modern Islamic political paradigm thus emerged with a
double role, namely to justify the political reality on rhe one hand,
and to provide that political reality with moral duties on the orher.
The first position became rhe srress of the juristic rendency, and the
second was the main purpose of the administrative bureaucratic and
the philosophic tendencies. Both positions were meanr to assert rhe
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supremacy of religion over politics. As a result' the symbiosis be-
tween religion and politics in the pre-modern paradigm apPeared to
clarify the function of each in their mutual relationship.
Flowever, pre-modern Islamic political thought is not uniformly
articulated. Al-Mawardi (d. 1058), for example, emphasized the pro-
phetic mission of the caliphatic political institution as including both
religious and temporal purposes 
-suggesting a reciprocity between
religion and politics, i.e, that religion affirmed the "religiouso nature
of this political institution, which functioned to protect the religion
itself. Al-Ghaziii (d. 1111) chose to assert the twin-brotherhood of
religion and politics and its divine nature 
-implied juxtaposition of
the two. Since al-Mawardi and al-Gazilt responded to the political
realities from the point of view of religion, their solutions in fact
aimed at "religionizing'politics. If that is the case, then the mutual
relationship in the symbiosis can be described as religion guiding
politics which, in turn, benefits religion itself. Al-Faribt (d. 950) went
even further in his analysis of the nature of the symbiosis. Based on
his concept of the ideal society, he held that religion determines an
ideal form of political institution, and that this was, at the same time,
the ultimate goal of religion itself.
The pre-modern political thinkers, despite their diverse inclina-
tions in their attempts to harmonize the religious and political reali-
ties, seem to have reached an agreement that religion and politics in
Islam are symbiotically related. Both the caliphate and the ideal soci-
ety symbolized the symbiosis between religion and politics, or, in
other words, they were, in fact, political regimes but with religious
ends.
The modern paradigm of Islamic political thought offers another
kind of symbiotic relationship between religion and politics. Unlike
the pre-modern paradigm which subordinated politics to religion,
the modern paradigm subordinates religion to politics. In this con-
text, the modern Muslim political thinkers tend, in their responses
to modern political ideas and institutions, to make religion a means
of legitimation for the sake of reconciling religious ideals and the
political realm. This legitimation takes the form of a return to an
autochthonous Islamic political and cultural inspiration, either in
the form of revealing a traditional political institution and retrieving
an Islamic alternative, or in the form of seeking comPatibility be-
tween an Islamic institution and modern institutions.
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However, the modern thinkers'subordination of religion to poli-
tics does not mean that rhey neglect the shart'ah. The modern para-
digms maintain a strong allegiance to scripruralism, but this allegiance
is meant to be a search for a "refuge" from the peril, as they perceive
it, of 'Westernization. In this case, rhe modern thinkers'allegiance to
scripturalism, particularly that of traditionalists, did not lead them
to exercise a real ijtihid by elaborating on Islamic injunctions from
scripture in order to encounter the incoming cultural force, because
they in fact avoided the encounter and thus escaped the problem.
Muslim political thinkers in the modern period, such as Rashtd RidA
and Sayyid Qutb may well have intended to solve the problem, yet
it remains unsolved. This problem, sremming primarily from the
inevitable dialogue between Islam and moderniry, lies in the ques-
tion of how to develop Islamic authenticity in the process of mod-
ernization.
The modernists also not succeed in solving the problem because
of their partial trearment of both hlamic authenticiry and moder-
nity. In their leaning towards modernity, they are trapped in a su-
perficial level of meaning, resulting in the adaptation of moderniry's
outer form without actually adopting its inner dynamic for progress
and development. The modernists' inclinarion roward scripturalism
also does not lead them to its esoteric dimension of significance, and
therefore they fail to find scripturalism's porential morality for the
development of human civilization. The rationalization of
Muhammad'Abduh (d. 1905), the secularizationof 'Ali ibn'Abd al-
Rlziq (d.1966), and the speculative reconsrrucrion of Muhammad
Iqbal (d. 1938) did echo appeals to cultural reform and liberalism,
but these were not followed by a systematic blueprint of moderniza-
tion.
If the pre-modern paradigm of Islamic political thought tended to
"religionize politics", the modern paradigm tended to politicize reli-
gion. The politicizarion of Islam, in this case, rook the form of the
creation, in the name of Islam, of political ideas and institutions to
justify the ongoing political processes. This attempt thus far failed to
achieve significant results in bringing Muslim culture to a level of
superiority in the course of its acculturarion with both 'Western and
indigenous cultures. The main problem of the modern paradigm lay
in its "inferiority complex' in the face of W'esrern cuhure, and this
leads to the emergence of rwo exrremist attitudes toward the Vest:
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positivism on the part of Islamic modernism and negativism on the
part of both Islamic conservatism and Islamic fundamentalism. Both
attitudes reveal the crisis in which modern Islam has found itself and
suggest that the problem involving Islam and modernity has remain
unsolved. In the political domain, this means that the modern para-
digm of Islamic political thought has not yet brought about a satis-
f.aitory reconciliation between Islamic ideals and the political realm.
How about modern Islamic political thought in Indonesia?
Indonesian Political Islam: A Socio'cultural Setting
Indonesian political Islam is not a single phenomenon, it consists
of heterogeneous features. This heterogeneity embodies at lea$ three
dimensions. The first is cultural, that is, the various Muslim groups
in Indonesia have distinct religio-cultural backgrounds which corre-
spond to their socio-cultural backgrounds. Pluralism in Indonesian
society, with its Muslim majority, is based on common ethnic back-
grounds, languages and customs, but has also been strongly influ-
enced by geography; by the power of nature over culture. The affin-
ity of the socio-cultural dimension with the religio-cultural Indone-
sian may be explained by the fact that, at the practical level, religion
is an aspect of culture. The transformation of cultural behavior into
religious cultural behavior goes through the process of religious per-
ception.
The second factor is psychological. This cultural sentiment and
tension developed a certain psychological distance among Muslim
groups. A religious theory originating in one group would be ex-
plored and challenged in dialectical interaction by other theories
originating in other groups. There was constant debate, and in of-
fensive-defensive interaction, new theories were brought forward to
support the paradigm of one or another particular group. Thus, ev-
ery new religious idea had a functional dimension : it was a tool to
justify the cultural solidarity of its originaters.
The third factor is political. This developed out of two previous
factors. Each group engaged in political competition in order to dem-
onstrate its cultural identity and to disseminate its own religious views.
The political history of Islam in the Old Order Indonesia included
competition between various Islamic political parties, each compet-
ing with the others in promoting its own "ideology" in order to gain
political support from the ummdt Islam f.or its own sectarian goals'
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Indonesian political Islam has faced a dilemma sremming from sev-
eral factors. The first is overestimation of the strength of political
Islam. Muslim political leaders have often proudly referred to Indo-
nesia as ninety per cenr Muslim, basing on this claim, their opti-
mism regarding gaining political power. Yet such overesrimarion and
optimism is far from reality. In fact, less than 50 per cent of voters
supported the Islamic parties in the national election of.1955; and
only 27.lto/o, 29.29o/o, 27.78Yo, and 18.8olo of vorers supported the
PPP (a party with Muslim social origins) in 197I, t9zi, t98Z and
1987 respectively. Compared ro rhe number of Muslim vorers in each
general election, these statistics also show that agreat number of Mus-
lim voters did not support formalistic political Islam (read: Islamic
parties/PPP), as found in 1955 (50.57.), 1971 QL.PA,7977 (30.670),
1982 (31.3"/0) and 1987 (18.0"/.).3
The second factor is what may be called an "ambivalent definition"
of the ummat Islarn Qvluslim community). Although many Muslim
leaders claim that the followers of Islam consrirure about 90 per cent
of the total popularion, their use of the term ummat Islam is incor-
rect and misapplied. This in turn has misled many observers of Indo-
nesian politics, since they perceive Muslims to be the supporters of
political Islam. Muslim leaders use rhe term ummat Islarn, as many
observers do, to refer to those who are formally members and sup-
porters of an Islamic political partf t or of any social organizations
with Islamic symbols and names. By so doing, they exclude a large
number of those who confess Islamic belief and do not wanr ro be
called non-Muslims.a
The third factor is that rhere has not yer been a development of
thought among Muslim political leaders and thinkers ,egaiding the
appropriate relationship between Islam and politics. It can be said
that all Muslim leaders view the rwo as being inseparable, or thar
politics is included in Islam. Also, concerning the kind of political
system to be adopted, in general, as Ahmad Syafii Maarif concluded,s
Indonesian Muslims leaders had, from the very beginning, chosen a
democratic political sysrem. In their view, democracy is a political
mechanism whose use is most relevant to the achievement of the
hlamic political ideal.
Yet, the quesrion of how Islam is to be implemented in day-to-day
politics and in order to achieve the Islamic polirical ideal, or, in Allan
Samson's terms, how Islamic belief is to be realized in political ac-
tion, has received no single answer.
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The Tendencies of Indonesian Islamic Thought
Islamic intellectualism in Indonesia in the last few decades has
represented a variety of ideas, yet they have a common purpose, of
reformulating Islamic answers to the social problems faced by the
Muslim community. These ideas resulted from two coincidental fac-
tors, the real condition of the Muslim community stemming from its
struggle in seeking an appropriate relationship between hlam and
Indonesian culture, and the emergence of a new educated Muslim
generation. This generation is the product of some four decades of
history since Indonesia's independence. The leaders of this genera-
tion are concerned about the condition of the Muslim community
and are dissatisfied with the ways the older generation has attempted
to overcome problems.
In general, hlamic thought in modern Indonesia may be cate-
gorized, in terms of emphasis, into three tendencies.6 The first ten-
dency maintains the necessity f.or a new theology to be adopted by
Indonesian Muslims in seeking an appropriate relationship between
the Islamic world view (uauasan keiskman) and the Indonesian world
view (taauasan kebangsaan). This tendency is composed of two
schools of thought. One consists of the indigenists, i.e., those who
maintain that Islam is a universal religion but that its implementa-
tion should be culturally specific.
The pioneers of this school are inclined to suggest that Islamiza-
tion in Indonesia should not contradict the process of
Indonesianization, as Islam, according to them, is complementary to
the Indonesian worldview. Indigenist thinkersview Pancasila as being
similar to the Medinah Charter and at most is an expression of Islam
as relevant to Indonesia.T
The other school consists of the universalists. The pioneers of
this school assert that Islam is a universal religion based on the prin-
ciple of unity (uzohtd). From their point of view, Islam has, from the
begi;rning, had a revolutionary character which enables Muslims to
take part in social change.8 According to the universalists there are
some fundamental values that should be applied by Muslims in or-
der to establish a state or a society: justice, including equality of op-
portunity and equality of results; and consultation (sbttri), which is
the essence of democracy.
The second tendency considers that the main problem faced by
Indonesian Muslims is in the political field, in particular concerning
the question of what the proper relationship between Islamic belief
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and political actions should be. Intellectuals of this tendency are con-
cerned with the fact that Muslims, regardless of their demographic
potential, occupy only a marginal position in the national political
arena. In their observation, the situation derived from Muslims' in-
effective role in playing politics is due to some internal problems, a
long side the fact that the regime exercised some political engineer-
irg.
The pioneer of this tendency suggest a political mode of problem
solving. In the intellectual domain, problem solving initiates politi-
cal ideas that seek the appropriate place and role of Muslim groups
in Indonesian political history and in the national development of
the nation.
The third tendency holds that the main problems of Muslims in
Indonesia lie in the areas of economy and education. The pioneers of
this tendency are mostly involved in community development ac-
tivities through the various non-governmental organizations (I.{GO$
that they have established. The involvement of Muslim activists in
NGOs is remarkable. The wide range of activities of these NGOs in
community development has had a great impact on the development
of the Muslim community, particularly in rural areas.
The Mainstreams of Indonesian Political Thought
Despite the weaknesses of categorizational analysis in explaining
the nature of the reality, e categorization is inevitable if one is to
analyze a complex phenomenon, such as Islamic movements and
thought in a predominantly Muslim country like Indonesia. Ana-
lytical categories will not only help to distinguish the viable tenden-
cies involved in the manifold phenomena of Islamic movements and
thought 
-forming diverse types of responses to the external chal-
lenge, namely the West-, but will also help to clarify the degree of
influence exerted by similar movements and ideas maintaining the
continuity of the Islamic social and religious heritage.
As far as political thought is concerned it is observable that there
have been at least three mainstreams of thinking among Indonesian
Muslim intellectuals. These mainstreams are the outcome of "dialec-
tical" interactions among intellectuals and became nuances in the
variegated pattern of Islam in modern Indonesia.
The first mainstreams may be called "formalistic". This term is
meant to denote the mode of thought of those maintaining the strict
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observance of recognized Islamic forms. Formalism in Islamic thought
usually emphasizes the Arabic cultural symbolism which is believed
to be prestine klam. Stressing the utilization of Arabic cultural terms
in non-Arab countries, like Indonesia, indicates the importance of
religious formalism. That is to say that the substantive meanings of a
term, which may well be conveyed in other languages, do not seem
more important than their forms. The emphasis here lies in the real
effect of the terms, rather than the epistemological sense of compre-
hension. This tendency shows a lack of creativity in developing socio-
cultural terms in the language of the specific culture, which, in sub-
stance, convey the essence of Islamic teachings. The formalists' pres-
ervation of the linguistic authenticity of the revelation not only re-
veals their strong attachment to scripturalism, but also shows their
tendency to take a literal or teffual approach to it.
Some elements of Islamic formalism are viable, in for example the
ideas of universalist intellectuals. 10 Islamic universalism upholds both
the universal and the totalitarian nature of Islam. Universalist think-
ers tend to emphasize Godly authority in the principle of unity
(aathtQ, which in their view serves to liberate human beings from
non-Godly authorities. The universalist thinkers share the idea of
Islamic fundamentalism, particularly regarding to the phenomena of
''Westoxication," to borrow Amien Rais'term, or Saefuddin's "mod-
ern jAhili society. "In order to make Islam a liberating force, the uni-
versalists see the necessity of an institutionalized Islam. As Saefuddin
has stated, this institutionalization would pave the way for the emer-
gence of a "Qur'lnic modern society, that is, a society which is ca-
pable of guarding itself from the overflowing cultural trends
transforming universal culture". 11
The necessary of emphasizing the existence of Islamic institutions
as the formal agencies ro carry out Islamic principles characterizes
Islamic formalism. In the political sphere this mainstream Proposes
an Islamic form of a political institution. Therefore it is opposed to a
mainstream which tends to stress the importance of a substantial
level of meaning while denouncing formalistic modes of thought.
This mainstream can, thus, be labelled "substantivistic."
This term is meant to signify the political orientation of those
emphasizing that there must be substantial manifestations of Islamic
values in political activities, not merely their formal appearance, ei-
ther in types of political ideas or in institutions. To the proponents
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of this orientation, the intrinsic exisrence of Islamic injunctions in
the Indonesian political scene is more imporrant, and is sufficiently
adequate to promote Islamization in the face of culturalizarion ro-
wards a modern Indonesian society.
This serves as one basic argumenr for the substantivists, that in
the historical perspective, rhis culturalization has included competi-
tion between various cultural forces and Islam is iust one of them. In
order for Islam to be victorious in this comperition, Islamization,
the substantivists say, must take the form of culturalizarion, nor
politicization; Islamic movements should become cultural move-
ments, rather than political movements.
The idea of emphasizing a cultural mode of Islamization has been
advocated by the so-called indigenist thinkers,12 who have sought to
adjust Islamic ideals to Indonesian national cuhure, and who make a
clear distinction between Islam and the state. One pioneer of
indigenism was Abdurrahman Vahid, who initiated the idea of the
"domestication" of IsIam (pribumisasi Islam) in the face of Indone-
sian.culture. The idea was based on a postulate of the pluralism of
Indonesian society, in which Islam serves as merely one complemen-
tary f.actor.In this connecrion, it is imporranr for Muslims to de-
velop a national consciousness (kesadaran kebangsaan). Because, as
\ilahid viewed it, it was on the basis of this consciousness that the
Indonesian state was established.r
Vahid's socio-historical argumenr makes a consequential plea for
the de-ideologization of Islam. In rhe Indonesian conrexr, this idea
has shown a dialectical dynamic, ro borrow Ali and Effendy's term,
in overcoming the conceptual problem concerning the relationship
between an Islamic worldview (wawasan keislaman) and an Indone-
sian worldview (uawasan keindonesiaan),andhas contributed to seek-
ing a place for klam within the framework of the Pancasila stare.
Likewise, this is the case with Nurcholish Madjid's ideas. His pro-
posal "Islam-Yes, Islamic Pany-No" and his view of klam as a comple-
mentary factor served not as a point of departure, but rather as a
concluding remark derived from his reflecrions on Islam and Mus-
lim historicity in Indonesia. He finds that, as a religion of. fitrah 
-
stressing human being's inherent potential in upholding the true and
the good- Islam is indeed a universal religion confirming universal
humanistic ideals, teaching inclusivism rarher than exclusivism.
Islam's inclusive narure brought Madjid ro suggesr an inclusive mode
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of interrelation and interaction to be maintained by Indonesian
Muslims in the context of the pluralistic configuration of Indonesia
society.
Madjid goes on to maintain that it is imperative to consummate
democratization, which he views as a dynamic process adequately
enabling a society to draw closer to democracy. This, he states, ne-
cessitates a "gentleman's agreement" that transcends religious as well
as cultural primordialism.It was on the basis of this idea that Madjid
developed his juxtaposition of Pancasila with the Medinah Charter,
which, in his view, constitutes a consensus between Muslims and
other groups to build a political society for all. Thus, Indonesian
Muslims, he said, did not perceive Pancasila and the 1945 Constitu-
tion as alternatives to Islam, just as the Prophet Muhammad and his
followers did not conceive the Medinah Charter as an alternative to
their new religion.
The historical and philosophical justifications of the substantivist
thinkers concerning the proper relationship between Islam and the
state has led to their substantiation of the existing forms of political
institutions. Substantivism, in the Indonesian case, has also mani-
fested itself in a more "praxical" mode among the the NGO's activ-
ists such as Dawam Rahardjo or Amin Azizwho chose to emphasize
"program actions" over "theoretical propositions." Their substan-
tial level of observation of the problems of the Muslim community
has encouraged them to launch community development programs
of non-political activities, yet which could have political implica-
tions. It is for this reason that these thinkers are included in the
substantivistic political mainstream.
Apart from the formalistic and substantivistic mainstreams, which
are diametrically opposed to each other, a third mainstream cannot
be ignored. This mainstream tends to retrieve and insert Islamic fun-
damentals into current social and political realities and tries to re-
vive Islamic culture. This mainstream, which may be labelled
'fundamentalistic" on the one hand, and "revivalistic" on the other,
had, as their point of departure, a conviction that both the other
mainstreams had failed to show Islam as a counter-balance in order
to provide an Islamic response to Indonesian modernization.
Meanwhile, from the methodological perspective, Muslim funda-
mentalists and revivalists cannot be said to maintain one of the two
approaches to Islam, i.e., formalistic and substantivistic, in a separate
Stcdia klamiha, VoL 2, No. 4, 1995
62 M, Din Syamsaddin
and strict sense. They tend ro combine or choose one of the two
approaches in accordance wirh the subject marrer. In the political
context it evinces an orientation rhat has always tended to sustain
the pre-conceived forms of Islamic polities, such as the importance
of a formal Islamic political party (bearing the name of klam), the
expression of hlamic political idioms and symbolism, and, at the
utmost, experimentation with an Islamic consrirurional organization.
From the point of view of the Muslim revivalists, a rrue Islamic
culture has to be revived. This aim necessitates cultural transforma-
tion into an klamic one. If the transformation of society means so-
cial change, Islam's transformative nature requires a process of change,
either revolutionary or evolutionary. The choice between these two
options remains uncertain and ambivalent in the fundamentalistic
and revivalistic mainstream thinking of Indonesian Muslims.
The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia was in-
fluenced in part by an external international factor, that is, the de-
velopment of fundamentalism in the Muslim world, and by the in-
ternal dialectical dynamic within the Muslim community in Indone-
sia. The social and political inability and ineffectiveness of the estab-
lished Islamic movemenrs in the face of the regime's national devel-
opment encouraged the emergence of "Islamic revivalism" in Indo-
nesia. Indeed, Muslim revivalists challenge the Islamic establishment
by offering a kind of alternative.
Islamic history in New Order Indonesia has witnessed the com-
ing into being of several Islamic revivalist groups, including the
Jaml'ah Tabligh (Association of Islamic Preaching), the JamA'ah
Tanbih ("Islamic 
'Varning"), the Hizb al-Tahrir (Party of Libera-
tion), the Shi'ah, and the Usrah (literally "family") circles, who ad-
here to both the IkhwXn al-Muslim0n (1r4uslim Brotherhood) in Egypt
and the Jamaat Islami (Islam Association) in Pakistan. These groups,
have not, in fact, revealed a visible mainstream but are increasing.
Yet, what is clear is that they challenge rhe mainsrreams, the estab-
lished Islam.
The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in conremporary In-
donesia was encouraged by the situational logic of politics, in which
Muslims are threatened while Islamic organizations do not take any
measures to arriculate their political interests. Furthermore, the ac-
commodative ideas of modernist Muslim thinkers are, of course, from
the perspective of Muslim fundamentalists, perceived as leading po-
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litical Islam to further defeat. These internal factors are triggered by
an external factor, the influence of the Islamic revolution in Iran.
This became effective with the publication of influential works by
Iranian intellectuals like 'Ali Shari'ati, Mutahhari and Khomaini.
The success of that revolution inspired the fundamentalists to dream
of it happening in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country.
However, the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism was not so at-
tractive to the majority of Indonesian Muslims. There are three Pos-
sible reason for this. Firstly, the nature of Indonesian Islam which,
following the line of Indonesian culture, is devoted to moderation,
tolerance and harmony, would hardly find any kind of radical and
fundamental change acceptable. Secondly, the situational logic of
politics, which has created fear and to some extent apathy within the
iociety would scarcely encourage Muslim leaders to initiate political
change by attempting to seek justifications for Islam. Thirdly, the
no.rel feature of Indonesian national politics that is favorable and
conducive to the Islamic cause, also impedes the fundamentalist
orientation in religious life.
Discourses on Islam and the State
Little intellectual response has been shown, such as elaboration
on the relationship between klam and the state, the Pancasila and
politics, with the exception of the accommodationist responses of
Mintaredja and Nurcholish Madjid.la Mintaredja (then chairman of
Parmusi and later of the PPP) in his reflection on Islam and Pancasila,
considers that Islam does not aim at the creation of an Islamic state
because, "during the time of the Prophet Muhammad...the term'state'
in the sense of state as we know it today, was not yet in existence".ls
In Mintaredja's view, the duty of Muslims is to struggle to create a
true Muslim society, which should be distinguished from an Islamic
state. A Muslim society can legitimately exist in a state without un-
dermining its integrity as the nation-state.16
Concerning the relationship between Islam and politics,
Mintaredja, while believing in the totalistic characteristic of Islam as
a way of iife, including political life, maintains that political issues
are worldly in nature and as such an approach to political issues
should be in accordance with this nature' The core of Mintaredja's
ideas is that "there is to some extent a seParation between State and
Church in klam".Y
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Having observed the problematique of Indonesian Islam, which
lies in the paradox between the defeat of political lslam and the rapid
expansion of Islam, Nurcholish Madiid came to the conclusion that
its quantitative growth was not encouraged by Islamic parries or or-
ganizations, for these organizations have failed to build a positive
and sympathetic image of Islam.18
rJ(ith regard to the relationship between religion and politics,
Nurcholish Madjid preferred to separare the two. To him politics,
or more precisely the srare, is one of the aspects of material life whose
dimension is rational and collective, whiie religion is another kind
of life whose dimension is spiritual and personal. Thus, the concepr
of an Islamic state is a distortion of the appropriate relationship be-
tween Islam and the state. According to Madjid the idea of an Islamic
state in fact reflects a kind of apologetic arrirude on ar leasr rwo bases,
as follows:
"The first was an apology in relation ro modern Western ideologies
such as democracy, socialism, communism and others...The apology in re-
lation to modern ideologies gave rise to an ideological-political understand-
ing of Islam which then led to the ideal of an "Islamic state"...This totalitar-
ian ideological-political apperception led to the emergence of apologetic
thinking which declared that Islam was nor merely a religion...(but) ad-
din.,.The apology...was deemed necessary because in modern li{e, domi-
nated by ril/esrern patrerns, the most important aspects of life are the politi-
cal, economic, social and the rest...Thus the apology was compensadon for
an inferiority complex".le
Leaving aside polemics among Muslim thinkers about the ques-
tion of the relationship between hlam and the state which revived
the dynamism of Islamic thought in Indonesia ar rhe beginning of
the 1970s, Madjid's ideas, and those of Mintaredja, clearly showed
an accommodative tendency toward the regime's political policy.
These ideas, according to Madjid, consrirute 6an artempr ro reformu-
late in general terms the fundamental Islamic postulares regarding
God, man and the physical world, and the manner of their relation-
ship in the light of new political realities".rc
Other than this mode of intellectualism, so-called "infra-srrucrural
politics" is also emerging. This idea refers ro political activiries aimed
at empowering the people through srrengrhening their infra-struc-
tures. Some have attributed this kind of orientation to NGO activ-
ists, such as Abbdurahman'Wahid.21
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"Infra-srructural politics" is fashionable among Muslim NGo ac-
tivists who believ. ihrt empowermenr of the Muslim community
can only be achieved through community development. In their view,
this process will lead to rhe development of a civil society in Indone-
sra.
Meanwhile rhere are those who rry ro broaden the political le-
verage of Islam through srructural pathways. Among its ardent sup-
porters are ICMI activists, Muslim politicians and bureaucrats. In
their opinion, Islam has to maintain relative proximity.with, instead
of hostility towards the state. This is to ensure the political participa-
tion of Muslims in the decision making Process.
Concluding Remarks
The reconciliation between Islamic ideals and political realities
became more difficult when Islam faced an indigenous culture and
politics, which also faced the same challenge: the cha-llenge of mo-
iernity. The implementation of Islamic ideals into political realities,
in this context, iaces the problem of strategic accommodation, that
is the problem of how to accommodate modernity and indigenism.
AcLulturation berween Islam and the indigenous political culture
and also modernist culture has been taking place through a recipro-
cal mode of interaction producing a harmonious relationship between
the regime and the un'tmdt Islam.It is this relationship that has en-
couraged the emergence of an Islamic cultural revival'
The harmonious relationship berween the regime and the ummdt
Islam rs the result of the transformation of political ideas and prac-
tices among Muslim political thinkers and activists.z According to
Bahtiar Effendy, thiJtransformarion is the result of an integrative
approach to*ards political realities by Muslim intellectuals, who
responded with thiee different modes of intellectualism: theologi-
cal7re[gious renewal, political/bureaucratic reform, and social trans-
formation. z
It is obvious that the drive towards Islamic cultural revival was
not indebted to the politicization of Islam, in its strictest sense' i.e.'
the pursuit of practiial politics, but rather, to a viable dynamic yet
harmonic atmosphere within the Muslim community at large. This
state of affairs reiulted from the Process of the Muslims' self-resigna-
tion, a process which, in turn, led them to exercise another type of
strrrggli and interaction with the authority. Instead of striving to
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political Islam, again in the sense of playing pracrical politics, the
Muslim groups launched a campaign of "cultural absorption into
Islam".
As a result, there emerge three kinds of religious consciousness
among Indonesian Muslims. The "lower class" 
-who have not sharedthe advantages of modernization, because rhis has only, for rhem,
broadened the social and economic gap between rhe haves and the
have-nots- reacted by returning to hlam. The common people ex-
pressed their religious consciousness through their active ait.ndatrce
at various religious gatherings, while others, particularlyMuslim stu-
dents, attempted to seek an Islamic response to social problems. The
"middle class", the petit bourgeoisie, who have lived a material life,
felt it necessary ro clothe themselves with a religious life on both rhe
individual and rhe social levels.
The increase of religious consciousness among Indonesian Mus-
lims could usher in a new dimension of Islamic potiry in Indonesia
which could lead to the development of a civil society. This is only
possible if Muslim groups, the majority of the Indonesian peopli,
maintain their commitment to democracy, social justice, and peace.
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